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2012 National Environmental Law Moot Court
Competition Problem
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
__________________________________
STATE OF NEW UNION,
Appellant and Cross-Appellee,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF PROGRESS,
Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
__________________________________ )

)
)
)
) C.A. No. 11-1245
)
)
)
)

ORDER
Following the issuance of the Order of the District Court
dated June 2, 2011, in Civ. 148-2011, the State of New Union and
the State of Progress each filed a Notice of Appeal. New Union
takes issue with the decision of the lower court with respect to its
holding: that New Union lacked standing to challenge the permit
issued by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (COE) to
the Department of Defense (DOD) pursuant to the Clean Water
Act (CWA) Section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 to fill Lake Temp; that
the COE has jurisdiction to issue the permit under CWA Section
404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344; and that the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) did not violate the CWA when it resolved a dispute
between the COE and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) over whether the COE had jurisdiction to issue the permit
under CWA Section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, or EPA had the
jurisdiction to do so under CWA Section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
The State of Progress takes issue with the decision of the lower
court with respect to its holdings that the COE had jurisdiction to
issue the permit under CWA Section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344,
because Lake Temp is not navigable water.
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Therefore, it is hereby ordered that the parties brief all of the
following issues:
1. Whether the State of New Union has standing in its
sovereign capacity as owner and regulator of the groundwater in
the state or in its parens patriae capacity as protector of its
citizens who have an interest in the groundwater in the state.
(The State of New Union and the State of Progress argue that
New Union does have standing and that the court below erred in
granting the United States’ motion for summary judgment on this
issue; the United States argues that New Union does not have
standing and that the court below was correct in granting
summary judgment on this issue.)
2. Whether the COE has jurisdiction to issue a permit under
CWA Section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, because Lake Temp is
navigable water under CWA Sections 301(a), 404(a), and 502(7),
33 U.S.C. §§ § 1311(a), 1344(a), 1362(7). (The State of Progress
argues that it does not because Lake Temp is not navigable and
that the court below erred in granting the United States’ motion
for summary judgment on the issue; the State of New Union and
the United States argue that it does because Lake Temp is
navigable and that the court below was correct in granting
summary judgment on this issue.)
3. Whether the COE has jurisdiction to issue a permit under
CWA Section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, or the EPA has jurisdiction
to issue a permit under CWA Section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, for
the discharge of slurry into Lake Temp. (The State of New Union
argues that EPA has jurisdiction to issue a permit under CWA
Section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, for the discharge of slurry into
Lake Temp and that the court below erred in holding that the
COE has jurisdiction to issue a permit for that activity under
CWA Section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344; the State of Progress
(arguing in the alternative) and the United States argue that the
COE has jurisdiction to issue the permit and that the court below
was correct in granting summary judgment on this issue.)
4. Whether the decision by OMB that the COE had
jurisdiction under CWA Section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, and that
EPA did not have jurisdiction under CWA Section 402, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342, to issue a permit for DOD to discharge slurry into Lake
Temp and EPA’s acquiescence in OMB’s decision violated the
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CWA. (The State of New Union argues OMB had no authority to
determine that COE had authority under CWA Section 404, 33
U.S.C. § 1344, and EPA did not have authority under CWA
Section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, to issue the permit and that the
court below erred in holding that OMB’s intervention in the
permit issuance process was not improper; the United States and
the State of Progress argue that OMB’s actions were not improper
and the court below was correct in granting summary judgment
on this issue.)

Entered this

15th

SO ORDERED.
day of September, 2011.

[NOTE: No decisions decided or documents dated after September
1, 2011 may be cited either in the briefs or in oral argument.]
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW UNION
________________________________
State of New Union,
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
United States,
) Civ. No. 148-2011
Defendant,
)
v.
)
State of Progress,
)
Intervenor/Defendant.
)
________________________________ )

Procedural History
The State of New Union seeks review under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702, of
an individual permit issued by the Secretary of the Army, acting
through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE), under the
authority of section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344, to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to discharge a
slurry of spent munitions into Lake Temp, an intermittent lake
wholly within an arid military reservation owned by the United
States in the State of Progress. New Union argues that any
permit for the discharge must be issued by the Administrator of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to her
authority to issue permits for the discharge of pollutants under
CWA Section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, rather than by the COE
under section 404. Plaintiff also contends that the Defendant
may not proceed with the project in the absence of a permit under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 69017000, but that challenge is not the subject of the cross-motions for
summary judgment considered here. The State of Progress,
within whose boundaries the permitted activities will take place,
has intervened. New Union, the United States, and the State of
Progress have filed motions for summary judgment. New Union
seeks a ruling that the 404 permit is invalid.
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Factual Background
The relevant facts are not contested by the parties, except as
indicated in this opinion.
Lake Temp is an oval-shaped
intermittent body of water that is up to three miles wide and nine
miles long during the rainy season in wet years, much smaller
during the dry season, and wholly dry approximately one out of
five years. Although the lake is not far from the New Union
border, Lake Temp at its highest water level is wholly within the
State of Progress. Surface water flows into Lake Temp from an
eight hundred square mile watershed of surrounding mountains,
located primarily in Progress, with a small portion located in New
Union. There is no outflow from the lake. The Imhoff Aquifer is
located almost one thousand feet below Lake Temp. Although the
aquifer follows the general contours of the lake, the aquifer is
more extensive than the lake at its greatest extent. Ninety-five
percent of the aquifer is located within Progress, wholly under
the boundaries of the military reservation, and five percent of the
aquifer is located within New Union. The military reservation
boundary does not extend to the border with New Union. Dale
Bompers owns, operates and resides on a ranch located above the
small portion of the Imhoff Aquifer in New Union. The Imhoff
Aquifer is not potable or usable in agriculture without treatment
because of a high level of sulfur. This information about the
aquifer has been included in New Union’s groundwater inventory
since the time that the project was first proposed.
When the lake holds water during migration seasons, ducks
have historically used it as a stopover in their migration from the
Arctic to southern climes and back.
Hundreds, perhaps
thousands of duck hunters also used it over at least the last one
hundred years; most have been residents of Progress but about a
quarter were from out of state. A Progress state highway runs
along the southern side of Lake Temp, at the edge of the military
reservation and within one hundred feet of the shore when the
lake is filled to its historic high. The state highway intersects
with several roads that lead into New Union. When the lake
became part of a military reservation in 1952, the DOD posted
signs along both sides of the highway at intervals of one hundred
yards, twenty-five feet from the edge of the road; warning of
danger and that entry was illegal. There is no fence. There are
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clearly visible trails leading from the road to the lake and they
show signs of rowboats and canoes being dragged between the
highway and the lake. DOD has taken no measures beyond the
signs to restrict public entry, although DOD has knowledge that
people continue to use the lake for hunting and bird watching.
DOD proposes to construct a facility on the shore of Lake
Temp to receive and prepare a wide variety of munitions for
discharge into the lake. Preparation will begin by emptying
munitions of liquid, semi-solid and granular contents, which
include many chemicals on the Clean Water Act § 311 list of
hazardous substances, and mixing the contents with chemicals to
assure they are not explosive. The remaining solids, primarily
metals, will be ground and pulverized. Finally, water will be
introduced to both sets of waste to form a slurry, which will be
sprayed from a movable multi-port pipe. The current plan is to
spray only the portions of the lake that are dry. Due to the arid
nature of this location, the slurry will dry out soon after contact.
The pipe will be moved continually to deposit the slurry evenly
over the entire dry bed of the lake, so that eventually the entire
lakebed will be raised by several feet. DOD estimates that when
the operation is complete, the lake’s top water elevation will be
approximately six feet higher and its surface area will be two
square miles larger than at the present time. This process will
take several years, but once finished, it will not be recurring. The
COE will continually grade the edges of the new lakebed so that
runoff from the surrounding mountains will flow unimpeded onto
it. The lake, of course, will still remain, since it is at the low
point in the drainage basin and there is nowhere else for
precipitation falling in the basin to flow. Over time, alluvial
deposits from precipitation falling on the mountains and flowing
into the basin will cover the lakebed again, returning it to its preoperation condition, albeit at a higher elevation. The COE’s EIS
does not project that the Lake would intrude on New Union under
any of the scenarios studied for the project.
The Motions
After discovery, the Secretary of the Army filed a motion for
summary judgment on the basis that 1) New Union does not have
standing to appeal the permit issuance; 2) the COE had

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/1

6

2012]

NELMCC COMPETITION PROBLEM

7

jurisdiction to issue a permit for the discharge of fill under section
404 because: a) Lake Temp is navigable water; and b) Southeast
Alaska Conservation Council v. Coeur Alaska, Inc., 129 S. Ct.
2458 (2009), decided that a section 404 permit is required in this
situation rather than a section 402 permit; and 3) the
participation by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in
the decision that a section 404 permit rather than a section 402
permit should be issued did not violate the CWA. New Union
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment that 1) it has standing
to appeal the permit issuance; and 2) Lake Temp is navigable
water; but 3) the COE lacks jurisdiction to issue a permit under
section 404 because the materials it authorizes for discharge are
primarily pollutants rather than fill material, requiring a permit
from EPA under section 402 rather than from the COE under
section 404; and 4) participation by OMB in the decision-making
process violated the CWA. Progress also filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment asserting that: 1) New Union does have
standing; and either 2) Lake Temp is not within the jurisdiction
of the CWA and the activity requires no permit under either
section 402 or 404 because Lake Temp is not navigable water; or
3) the COE has jurisdiction to issue the permit under section 404
pursuant to Coeur Alaska; and 4) OMB’s participation in the
decision-making process did not violate the CWA.
Discussion
A. Standing
New Union argues it is injured in its sovereign capacity with
regard to that part of the Imhoff Aquifer located within New
Union and in its parens patriae capacity with regard to its
citizens who may be injured by the contamination of the aquifer.
The United States argues that New Union cannot sufficiently
establish that the discharge authorized by the Permit will cause
injury to it or its citizens to support standing. Progress did not
contest New Union’s standing in the District Court and supports
New Union’s standing in the 12th Circuit. New Union argues it
has a special interest as an affected state, subjecting it to a more
favorable test for standing under Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497, 518-20 (2007). The United States contends that
Massachusetts does not apply. Significantly, four of the Justices

7

8

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 3

in that case dissented from the majority’s view that states are
subject to a relaxed standing test, but New Union does not even
meet the majority’s relaxed test. Although New Union has
presented circumstantial evidence that contaminated water from
the permitted activity will enter the Imhoff Aquifer (because the
land between the lakebed and the aquifer is primarily
unconsolidated alluvial fill), New Union has presented no
evidence as to when the pollution will reach the edge of the
aquifer beneath New Union, the strength of the pollution when it
reaches that edge, or even that it will ever reach that edge. New
Union admits as much, stating that the timing and severity of the
pollution’s impact on the portion of the Imhoff that underlies New
Union depends on the direction and rate of flow of groundwater in
the aquifer and the top and bottom elevations of the aquifer
throughout its expanse, but they are presently unknown.
New Union presented evidence establishing that the
information needed regarding the movement of pollutants in the
Imhoff Aquifer can only be established by drilling and sampling
from a grid of monitoring wells throughout the aquifer. Its
evidence also establishes that if installation of such a grid of wells
began today, conclusive results might not be available until after
the permitted activity begins. Finally, although New Union
claims it is willing to install and operate the wells and to collect
the data, it avers that it cannot do so without permission from
DOD, but that DOD will not grant access to the military
reservation for that or other non-military purposes. DOD does
not deny these allegations, but adds that New Union has never
filed an application with DOD to install monitoring wells. DOD
also responds that New Union admits its injury, if there is one, is
susceptible to proof, and that New Union is capable of developing
that proof but has not done so. DOD also argues that it
completed an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the
project under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370H, in 2002 and that New Union did not comment on
or object to either the scoping of the EIS or the final EIS on the
basis of the unknowns concerning the Imhoff Aquifer. The COE
followed its normal procedures in terms of public notice at all
stages of its NEPA activities. All of the facts regarding the lake
and the aquifer mentioned in this decision were mentioned in the
EIS. DOD suggests that since New Union is now time-barred
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from objecting to the EIS, it is also estopped from raising issues
here that could have been dealt with in the EIS. New Union, of
course, has the burden of proving that it will be injured by the
complained-of activity and it has not carried that burden. There
is no evidence that pollution of groundwater owned or regulated
by New Union is imminent or ever will happen. The occurrence,
timing and severity of such contamination are completely
speculative. The evidence of present and future injury the state
presented in Massachusetts v. EPA was far less speculative than
that presented here by New Union.
New Union’s parens patriae standing as a representative of
its citizens is exemplified by Dale Bompers, who owns, operates
and resides on a ranch above the Imhoff Aquifer in New Union.
Bompers claims the value of his ranch will be diminished if the
Imhoff Aquifer below his ranch is contaminated by the permitted
discharge, although he presents no proof of a loss in property
value. He does not presently use the Imhoff Aquifer, for it is not
potable or fit for agricultural use without treatment, due to
naturally occurring sulfur in the aquifer. He has no definite
plans to use the Imhoff Aquifer in the future. Indeed, under the
New Union statute regulating use of groundwater, Bompers could
not withdraw groundwater from the aquifer without a permit
from the New Union Department of Natural Resources (DNR).
The statute requires DNR to determine that permitted
withdrawals will not deplete groundwater over a period of twenty
years. Although the statute does not limit withdrawals to owners
of land above the groundwater to be withdrawn, it gives a
preference to such owner if withdrawals are limited by
threatened depletion. Under the statute, no one has rights in
groundwater unless and until the DNR issues a withdrawal
permit. No such permits have been issued to date with respect to
the Imhoff Aquifer, and New Union law prohibits withdrawal of
groundwater without a state-issued permit. On these facts and
the facts related in the above paragraph, because Bompers would
have no injury to establish standing to challenge the permit
issuance, New Union does not have derivative standing under a
parens patriae theory.

9
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Although this disposes of New Union’s claim, for purposes of
judicial economy in the event of an appeal I will address the
remaining issues raised by the parties.
B. Navigability
Progress argues that Lake Temp is not a “water of the United
States” subject to the jurisdiction of the CWA and therefore does
not require a permit from either EPA under section 402 or the
COE under section 404. The lake is only intermittent and
regularly disappears entirely. Progress argues that intermittent
bodies of water are not navigable, citing Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). It is entirely intrastate; located
within a basin with no outlets, and flowing nowhere. It is not
used in interstate commerce, except in its role as a stopover for
migratory birds and Progress contends that is not a basis for
categorization as navigable water under Solid Waste Authority of
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC),
531 U.S. 159 (2001). The ponds at issue in SWANCC were from
less than an acre to several acres in surface area and from a few
inches deep to several feet deep. They were isolated from and
had no connection to navigable waters. The COE justified their
navigability only by reference to the “migratory bird rule” which
defined water as navigable, inter alia, if it was used as habitat by
birds in interstate migration.
The Court overturned the
migratory bird rule as outside the bounds of the CWA. Progress
argues that SWANCC perfectly matches the situation at Lake
Temp. DOD and New Union respond that Lake Temp is several
square miles, while the largest pond in SWANCC was only
several acres. Progress replies that small size may prevent
navigability, but large size does not establish it. The COE and
New Union argue further that Lake Temp has been part of the
highway of interstate commerce for interstate hunters, who not
only have hunted from the shores of the lake for over one hundred
years, but also have hunted from boats and canoes on the lake
and have rowed or paddled across the lake to hunt from the shore
opposite the highway. The size and use in interstate commerce of
Lake Temp differ greatly from the size and use of the ponds in
SWANCC, making that decision distinguishable. Lake Temp is
well within the description of water bodies that have traditionally

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/1

10

2012]

NELMCC COMPETITION PROBLEM

11

been held navigable because of use by interstate travelers (rather
than use by interstate birds).
C. Section 402 or 404?
The Supreme Court recently addressed the relationship
between section 402 and Section 404 in a similar context. In
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council the
Court held that the discharge of slurry into a lake, elevating and
changing the bottom configuration of the lake, was the discharge
of fill material requiring a section 404 permit, rather than the
discharge of a pollutant, requiring a section 402 permit. Coeur is
similar to this case in all relevant respects. In both cases, a lake
was to be filled. In both cases, the material filling it was slurry.
In both cases, the slurry was a pollutant as well as fill material.
In both cases, the COE issued a permit and EPA did not veto it.
In Coeur, the Court held that the issuance of a section 404 permit
made the discharge legal under section 301(c) of the CWA,
obviating the need for a section 402 permit. This Court is bound
by that decision to uphold the COE permit to fill Lake Temp.
New Union seeks to distinguish Coeur because the material
discharged in Coeur was crushed rock, an inert material that is
more a fill material than a pollutant, whereas here the material
discharged will be spent munitions: liquid and semi-solid
chemicals and pulverized metals, a toxic pollutant rather than an
inert fill. While it might have been rational for Congress to make
this distinction, it did not. Section 502(6) defines pollutants by
categories, including “munitions,” “chemical waste,” and “rock,”
rather than by degrees of toxicity or inertness and section 404
does not define fill by degrees of toxicity or inertness. The
distinction urged by New Union is not relevant to whether a
section 402 or section 404 permit is required. The materials to be
discharged in both cases fit well within the definitions of both
“pollutant” and “fill.” The more relevant defined term is “fill
material.” If it is fill material, Coeur decided, it is subject to a
section 404 permit, not a section 402 permit, because the CWA
provides that section 402 permits cannot authorize the discharge
of fill material. If it “has the effect of . . . [c]hanging the bottom
elevation” it is fill material. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2. There is no
question on this record that the discharge will elevate and change
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the bottom elevation of Lake Temp. Indeed, New Union does not
contest that fact. In summary, the discharge is both fill material
and a pollutant. As long as it is legitimate fill material, it is
subject to a section 404 permit, not a section 402 permit.
New Union also seeks to distinguish Coeur because the lake
in Coeur served the purpose of a treatment pond that otherwise
would have to be constructed, with a greater environmental
detriment, whereas here the lake is not serving as a treatment
alternative. To the contrary, while the lake in Coeur was treating
the mine’s effluent so that it met CWA effluent requirements
when lake wastewater was subsequently discharged to
downstream waters, the lake here is preventing the discharge of
any pollutants or wastewater to other navigable waters, in effect
creating zero discharge of pollutants, the goal of the statute. CWA
Section 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
New Union also seeks to distinguish Coeur because, in Coeur,
the COE made its decision as an uninterested regulator, while
here the COE is an interested subsidiary of the permit applicant.
It argues that the COE, as a regulator, is supposed to be
protecting the public. Here, however, the COE cannot help but be
serving the interests of DOD, a classic conflict of interest
situation. New Union argues that a more egregious case of the
fox guarding the hen house is difficult to imagine. It argues that
having EPA issue a 402 permit rather than the COE issuing a
section 404 permit will easily cure the conflict of interest.
The COE comments that New Union’s argument leads
nowhere. Granted, the COE is part of DOD, the COE is issuing
the permit to DOD, and the COE is in a subordinate relationship
to DOD. Is New Union arguing that if DOD is the permit
applicant, an organization outside of DOD must issue the permit
or that if the COE is the permit issuer, DOD may not apply for a
section 404 permit? Those suggestions rewrite the statute, which
neither this Court nor Plaintiff can do. Congress determined the
COE would be the issuer of section 404 permits, that decision is
properly a legislative decision, and courts cannot rewrite the
statute to place section 404 permit issuance authority elsewhere
when DOD is the applicant for a section 404 permit. In any
event, the COE must apply the same legislative and regulatory
criteria when issuing a permit to DOD that it applies when
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issuing a permit to any other entity. And the public may
challenge the issuance of such permits if they do not meet those
statutory and regulatory criteria, as New Union is doing here.
This situation, although somewhat awkward in appearance, is
common. Many agencies must issue a permit to themselves or to
an entity in the same department. EPA, for instance, issues
permits for EPA laboratories and other EPA facilities with
discharges requiring section 402 permits.
D. OMB’s Participation
New Union notes that EPA made a positive decision in Coeur
not to veto the COE’s section 404 permit. Indeed, in Coeur EPA
issued a section 402 permit for the discharge from the lake to
downstream waters, incorporating the effluent limitations
applicable to treated wastewater from the operation. In essence,
EPA agreed with and participated in the COE’s interpretation of
the statute under the facts of the case. But here, New Union
argues, EPA was preparing to exercise its authority to veto the
COE’s section 404 permit and issue a section 402 permit, but the
OMB instructed EPA not to do so.1 EPA argued to OMB that the
nature of the discharge here was significantly different from the
discharge in Coeur, so as to warrant a different outcome,
requiring a section 402 permit at least for treatment of the nonfill liquid and semi-solid portion of the material before discharge
to navigable waters. New Union argues that Congress conferred
authority directly on the Administrator of EPA “to administer”
the CWA generally, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d), and in particular to veto
permits proposed by the COE, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c). Congress
conferred no authority directly or indirectly on OMB to issue
permits or veto permits under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342 or 1344 or to
decide which permit should be issued in any particular instance.
New Union argues that OMB violated the statute by directing
EPA not to veto the permit and EPA violated the statute by
acquiescing in OMB’s directive, both “incompatible with the will
of Congress and . . . [un]sustainable as a valid exercise of the
President’s Article II powers.” Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 627 F.
1. The COE and EPA both sent briefing papers on the issue to OMB and
attended a meeting with OMB, which culminated in OMB’s oral decision and
directive. The papers are not in the record of this case.

13
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Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986). One effect of OMB’s action is to place
the interpretation of the statute by OMB, not an administrator of
any portion of the statute, and the COE, the administrator of one
section of the statute, section 404, before this Court rather than
the interpretation of EPA, administrator of the more than one
hundred other sections of the statute, including the basic
prohibition in section 301(a), and of parts of section 404 itself.
New Union argues this prevents the Court from properly
interpreting the statute using a Chevron test. Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
The COE comments that New Union’s argument is a
collateral attack on EPA’s decision not to veto the COE permit.
The COE points out that EPA’s decision not to veto a section 404
permit is not subject to judicial review because EPA’s authority to
veto section 404 permits is wholly discretionary, and “agency
action . . . committed to agency discretion by law” is not subject to
judicial review, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). Even if EPA’s decision not to
veto the COE permit was subject to judicial review, review would
be limited to whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious
under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). EPA’s decision not to veto the COE
permit was neither arbitrary nor capricious because it was either
required by or consistent with the Court’s ruling in Coeur.
New Union protests that EPA made no decision not to veto
the COE permit; the OMB, in violation of the CWA, made that
decision. The COE admits that OMB resolved a dispute between
EPA and the COE over the permit, pursuant to procedures for
reconciling disputes within the executive branch first established
by Exec. Order No. 12,088, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (Oct. 13, 1978).
Nonetheless, the COE argues that after OMB’s decision EPA took
no further action, i.e., it decided not to veto the COE permit and
EPA’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious for two reasons.
First, EPA’s decision is required by or consistent with Coeur,
regardless of OMB’s participation. Second, all the executive
power of the United States is vested by the Constitution in the
President, not the Administrator of EPA or the Secretary of the
Army, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. Moreover, the Constitution
charges the President with the duty to “take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. That gives the
President both the duty and the power to assure that all
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discretionary decisions made within the executive branch,
including those made by the Secretary of the Army and the
Administrator of EPA, are faithful to the Constitution, treaties
and laws of the Nation. That power and duty necessarily
includes the authority to resolve legal and policy disputes
between executive branch entities. Differences of interpretation
often occur between two agencies in the executive branch and
sometimes they must be decided before the executive branch
takes action.
They certainly must be decided before the
government takes a litigation position, as it had to do here. If
OMB had not already decided the matter, the Attorney General
would have to have decided the matter prior to filing responses in
this case. The participation by OMB in EPA’s decision did not
violate the CWA, did not make EPA’s decision subject to judicial
review and did not render EPA’s decision arbitrary or capricious.
Finally, OMB’s participation did not affect the COE’s decision to
issue the permit or the terms of the permit it issued.
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment on the CWA counts and denies
Plaintiff’s motion:
Plaintiff has no standing;
The COE had jurisdiction to issue a section 404 permit for
the addition of fill to Lake Temp because Lake Temp is a
navigable water and the slurry is a fill material; and
OMB’s dispute resolution between EPA and the COE did not
violate the CWA.
SO ORDERED.
Romulus N. Remus
United States District Judge
June 2, 2011
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